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PROTECTING THE LEAST OF THESE: A NEW
APPROACH TO CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
PANDERING PROVISIONS
STEPHEN T. FAIRCHILD†
ABSTRACT
The pandering of child pornography—selling, distributing, or
conveying the impression that one possesses sexually graphic images
of children for sale or distribution—facilitates actual harm to
children, such as molestation. Yet legislative attempts to curb
pandering inevitably implicate concerns about panderers’ First
Amendment rights. This Note argues that in balancing the
vulnerability of children against the power of the First Amendment,
the law must shift to focus more on the subject of this grievous
harm—children. This approach will appropriately extend protection
to a subset of the population that is least able to protect itself.

INTRODUCTION
The advent of the Information Age has presented new
battlefields for government regulation and individual rights to
confront each other. Faced with mounting evidence of growth in
Internet child pornography,1 Congress has enacted several bills
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feedback provided by several Duke Law Journal editors, and to my family for encouraging me.
1. See, e.g., Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting our Children and the Constitution:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 60–61 (2002) [hereinafter Stopping
Child Pornography] (prepared statement of Ernest E. Allen, president and chief executive
officer of the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, and Daniel S. Armagh,
director of the Legal Resource Division, National Center for Missing & Exploited Children)
(testifying to 60,000 reports of child pornography in over four years since the establishment of
an Internet “CyberTipline” site); see also infra Part I.A.
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targeting the production, distribution, and advertising of this
2
material. As justification, Congress based these laws on voluminous
findings detailing how the market for child pornography has been
fueled by the addition of materials that are easily produced using
emerging technologies, how the Internet engenders evasive
dissemination of these materials, and how these materials are linked
3
to other harms to children such as sexual abuse. Even in the face of
these compelling factual findings, however, many attempts at
regulating the child pornography market have abutted an individual
right that is equally compelling in American tradition—the First
Amendment. In response to every law that Congress has passed to
curb the further growth of child pornography, litigants have
successfully raised claims that the law infringes on their fundamental
right to express themselves, effectively arguing that child
pornography is no less a valid mechanism of expression than
provocative political blogs, advertising banners with potentially
offensive messages at school-sanctioned events,4 or flag burning.5
Because of the free speech interests that child pornography laws
inevitably implicate, a large body of scholarship evaluates the
6
interplay between such laws and the First Amendment. In particular,
the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
7
Coalition, holding virtual child pornography to be a form of
protected speech, engendered a great deal of discussion in the
2. E.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified in scattered sections
of 18, 21, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2004)); Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009–26 (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260 (2000), invalidated
in part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002)); see also infra Part II.
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622, 2629 (2007) (holding a student’s First
Amendment rights were not violated when he was suspended after unfurling a banner that read
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”).
5. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (permitting flag burning as a means of
political expression).
6. See, e.g., Amy Adler, Child Pornography Law and the Proliferation of the Sexualized
Child, in CENSORING CULTURE: CONTEMPORARY THREATS TO FREE EXPRESSION 228, 228
(Robert Atkins & Svetlana Mintcheva eds., 2006) (asserting that “child pornography has
spawned an extraordinary and troubling body of case law” under the First Amendment).
Professor Adler notes, however, that the body of articles dealing with child pornography is
rather limited compared to other areas of First Amendment law, and even student notes that
treat the subject have often dealt with non-First Amendment issues such as statutory
interpretation. Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 924–25 &
n.15 (2001).
7. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
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8
academic literature. In contrast, the effect of so-called “pandering
provisions” has kindled little scholarship, in part because Free Speech
Coalition touched only tangentially on them.9 One case dealt head-on
with the federal pandering statute and found it both overbroad and
10
vague under First Amendment precedent. The government’s strong
interests in upholding pandering legislation together with the
vigorous defense mounted by those accused of pandering make this a
salient topic for legal exploration, especially given the wide-ranging
impacts of this litigation on American communities.
In the conflict between the power of the First Amendment and
the protective intent of child pornography legislation (particularly
pandering legislation), a focus on children as the object of the law’s
shielding power is not only normatively ideal, but also constitutionally
necessary. The Constitution’s guarantees of individual rights protect
not just those who have the luxury to claim their succor, but also “the
least of these”11—those vulnerable groups who may not even know
they are entitled to the law’s protection. Part I of this Note
documents the extent to which easy access to Internet child
pornography has fueled a market for such material, and has enhanced
the link between child pornography and the facilitation of other
crimes against children such as molestation. Part I further submits
that, though the vast majority of Americans finds child pornography
unacceptable, social norming influences within the small, insular
community of child pornography consumers create an impression that
this type of behavior is natural.12 In Part II, the Note chronicles the

8. See generally Susan S. Kreston, Defeating the Virtual Defense in Child Pornography
Prosecutions, 4 J. HIGH TECH. L. 49 (2004) (suggesting prosecutorial methods to prove that a
child featured in pornographic material is real); Arnold H. Loewy, Taking Free Speech
Seriously: The United States Supreme Court and Virtual Child Pornography, 1 FIRST
AMENDMENT L. REV. 1 (2003) (praising the Supreme Court’s decision protecting virtual child
pornography); Sara C. Marcy, Recent Development, Banning Virtual Child Pornography: Is
There Any Way Around Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition?, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2136 (2003)
(chronicling the legislative response to the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act (CPPA) in Free Speech Coalition).
9. Pandering is “[t]he act or offense of selling or distributing textual or visual material
(such as magazines or videotapes) openly advertised to appeal to the recipient’s sexual interest.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (8th ed. 2004). The federal pandering provision at issue in
recent litigation is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2004).
10. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127
S. Ct. 1874 (Mar. 26, 2007) (No. 06-694).
11. Matthew 25:40 (King James).
12. The passage of child pornography–protective legislation is not the imposition, by an
especially vociferous interest group, of self-righteous moral norms on an unreceptive society. Cf.
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ongoing seesaw between enactment of legislation designed to quell
the demand factors that drive the market for child pornography (with
an emphasis on pandering provisions), and the subsequent
overturning of such legislation by the courts on First Amendment
grounds. Part III offers a short critique of the reasoning in two such
decisions. Part IV argues that, because children are a fundamentally
different and more vulnerable subset of the population, a childcentered re-conceptualization of this area of First Amendment
jurisprudence is necessary to settle the free speech conflicts that
pandering legislation presents.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. Child Pornography and Sexual Abuse of Children
The majority of the American public opposes child
13
pornography because the promulgation of sexual images involving
those who are legally unable to consent harms children.14 Capturing
children in sexually graphic poses recorded in a permanent medium
stigmatizes the child subjects, who live with the specter of
pornographic photos following them around for generations.15
Moreover, though the definition of child pornography encompasses
16
actions other than sexual intercourse, the production of child
pornography often involves adults performing sexual acts with
children, which constitutes a crime under relevant statutory rape
laws.17 Thus, the use of children in sexually explicit material,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582–83 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(decrying mere disapproval by the majority as a justification for morality-based legislation).
Rather, the majority of the American people has, through legislative channels, identified a
problem resulting in actual harm to children and attempted to take measures to remedy it.
13. Child pornography is statutorily defined, and will be used for purposes of this Note, as
a visual depiction, if “the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)(A) (2000); id. § 2256(8)(A). A
minor is “any person under the age of eighteen years.” Id. § 2256(1).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 39–42.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (2000) (Congressional Findings of the 104th Cong.) (“[W]here
children are used in its production, child pornography permanently records the victim’s abuse,
and its continued existence causes the child victims of sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting
those children in future years.”).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. IV 2004) (including “graphic or simulated
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person” in the definition of what
constitutes “sexually explicit conduct”).
17. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (“A person is guilty of
rape in the first degree when . . . [h]e engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is
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according to Congress’s findings, itself constitutes sexual abuse.
Demand for these types of images is high, as evidenced by the size of
the market: the most reliable estimates place the financial activity
generated by child pornography in the multi-million dollar range,
though some figures have placed that value in the billions.19 Congress
has found a multi-million dollar interstate market for child
20
pornography that harms children’s health and is detrimental to all of
21
society. The Internet’s fast communications and relative anonymity
make it easy to exchange this material with others who have the same
interests. Although the precise volume of Internet sites dedicated to
sharing child pornography is difficult to estimate due to the risks
involved in revealing oneself as a consumer of this illegal product,22
one child pornographer estimated the number of new posts to the
most well-known child pornography Usenet group at between 5,000
to 7,000 per week.23 In a year-long period between 2000 and 2001,
United States law enforcement agencies arrested an estimated 2,577
people for crimes involving online sexual exploitation of minors, of

incapable of consent because he . . . [i]s less than twelve (12) years old.”); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.44.073(1) (2006) (“A person is guilty of rape of a child in the first degree when the person
has sexual intercourse with another who is less than twelve years old and not married to the
perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least twenty-four months older than the victim.”).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (2000) (Congressional Findings of the 104th Cong.) (“[T]he use
of children in the production of sexually explicit material . . . is a form of sexual abuse which can
result in physical or psychological harm, or both, to the children involved.”).
19. PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 34
(2001).
20. As Part I.B makes clear, a large swath of America disapproves of child pornography
and presumably does not engage in it. If this is true, why does child pornography generate such
a large market? One explanation is that even if relatively few people traffic in child
pornography, they do so on a massive scale involving thousands of pictures for sale. But see id.
at 91 (arguing that estimating the value of the child pornography “industry” is misleading
because most people who trade child pornography, even if in large volumes, do so out of noneconomic motivations).
21. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
§ 501(1)(A), 120 Stat. 587, 623 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note) (“The illegal production,
transportation, distribution, receipt, advertising and possession of child pornography . . . is
harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the children depicted in child
pornography and has a substantial and detrimental effect on society as a whole.”); see also id.
§ 501(1)(B) (“A substantial interstate market in child pornography exists, including not only a
multimillion dollar industry, but also a nationwide network of individuals openly advertising
their desire to exploit children and to traffic in child pornography.”).
22. JENKINS, supra note 19, at 56.
23. Id. at 55.
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24
which 36 percent were for child pornography. Of those arrested,
two-thirds had child pornography in their possession.25 One sting
operation alone netted 125 subscribers to child pornography
26
websites.
Even more troublesome is the clear causal link between the
viewing of child pornography and child molestation. Though viewing
child pornography does not, of course, inexorably lead to sex crimes
against children, statistics suggest that the connection between
viewing child pornography and committing subsequent sexual abuse
against children is significant. One study cited in congressional
testimony found that at least 80 percent of purchasers of child
27
pornography actively abuse children, and “a 1984 study by the
Chicago Police Department confirmed that in almost 100% of their
annual child pornography arrests, detectives found photos, films, and
videos of the arrested individual engaging in sex with other
children.”28 A 2000 study by the Bureau of Prisons revealed that, of
sixty-two offenders convicted of either child pornography or traveling
to engage in sex with a minor, 76 percent admitted to prior
unprosecuted sex crimes against children.29 A chief from the FBI’s
Crimes Against Children Unit testified that “[t]here is a clear
correlation between sexual abuse of children and the collection of
child pornography,” and cited an FBI sting operation that netted
ninety-two collectors of child pornography, thirteen of whom
admitted having sexually molested forty-eight children total.30 He
testified that images of child pornography “whet [child predators’]
appetites for real world sexual encounters with children.”31 Thus,
child pornography is causally linked to actual child molestation:

24. MONIQUE MATTEI FERRARO & EOGHAN CASEY, INVESTIGATING CHILD
EXPLOITATION AND PORNOGRAPHY: THE INTERNET, THE LAW, AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 9
(2005).
25. Id.
26. Scout Leader, Counselor Arrested in Child-Porn Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 19,
2006, at A7.
27. Stopping Child Pornography, supra note 1, at 65.
28. Id.
29. Enhancing Child Protection Laws after the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision,
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) [hereinafter
Heimbach Statement] (statement of Michael J. Heimbach, unit chief, Crimes Against Children
Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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“[Researchers] believe that child pornography is central to
pedophiliac psychology, social orientation, and behavior. . . . The
trading of pornography with other pedophiles may lead to exchanging
32
victims for their sexual services.”
Thus, to say that child pornography is just another form of
speech, worthy of protection under the First Amendment no matter
how repugnant its message, is not accurate. Rather, child
pornography is better described as a tool used to incite some cases of
child molestation. This incitement facilitates more abuse by
reinforcing the idea that it is acceptable for adults to have sexual
relations with children—an illegal act recorded by much child
33
pornography. Such imminently illegal incitement is never entitled to
First Amendment protection.34 Furthermore, child molesters can use
images of child pornography to become aroused, to persuade children
to acquiesce in sexual activity, or to coerce the child into participating
in sex through blackmail.35 Virtual child pornography,36 which
constitutes protected speech under the Supreme Court’s Free Speech

32. DIANE SCHETKY & ARTHUR GREEN, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: A HANDBOOK FOR
HEALTH CARE AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 154 (1988); see also KENNETH V. LANNING,
CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS FOR LAW-ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
INVESTIGATING CASES OF CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 31 (3d ed. 1992), available at http://
www.skeptictank.org/nc70.pdf (“The pedophile can also use the computer to troll for and
communicate with potential victims with minimal risk of being identified. . . . The child can be
indirectly ‘victimized’ through the transfer of sexually explicit information and material or the
child can be evaluated for future face-to-face contact and direct victimization.”); id. at 28 (“[I]n
most cases the arousal and fantasy fueled by [child] pornography is only a prelude to actual
sexual activity with children.”).
33. Enhancing Child Protection Laws after the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision,
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing of the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 14 (2002) [hereinafter Allen
Statement] (statement of Ernest E. Allen, president and chief executive officer, National Center
for Missing & Exploited Children) (“[C]hild pornography is not like other speech. It is a
molestation tool. It is a tool used by predators and pedophiles to seduce and manipulate, to
break down inhibitions, to make sex between adults and children appear normal.”).
34. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
35. Heimbach Statement, supra note 29, at 33; Allen Statement, supra note 33, at 29.
36. Virtual child pornography can include visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct
when “such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image
that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” 18
U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. IV 2004), or “such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or
modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” id.
§ 2256(8)(C) (2000).
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Coalition decision, can be used to lower children’s inhibitions in
37
preparing them for sexual activity with adults.
Importantly, the criminal abuse of children is directly linked with
the pandering of child pornography as well as the possession,
production, and distribution of such material. Pandering is “[t]he act
or offense of selling or distributing textual or visual material (such as
magazines or videotapes) openly advertised to appeal to the
38
recipient’s sexual interest.” Such advertising, even when there is no
underlying material, can lead to the intent to commit sex crimes
against children:
[W]e are operating an undercover investigation after we took down
a child pornography website. We actually, without putting any
images up, gave the impression that we could provide that content.
We had people sending us e-mail telling us that they wanted
bestiality involving children. They wanted torture of pre-teen girls.
We had people who were willing to pay to have sex with
children. . . . [W]e arrested a 55-year-old man who owned a horse
ranch in Detroit. He traveled to Dallas thinking he was going to
have sex with an 8-year-old girl. He sent us child pornography
electronically over the Internet before he arrived . . . to show to the
39
children. He showed them pictures of himself exposed . . . .

Here, the man to whom the child pornography was pandered not only
had imminent intent to have sex with an underage girl, but also
actually committed a sex-related crime (indecent exposure). The
advertising of child pornography materials, in this case, brought a
pedophile to the brink of committing a sexual crime involving a
minor, with only the intervention of law enforcement standing in his
way.
B. Social Norming
Whether because of the links between child pornography and
molestation, or because of shared moral concerns, a large majority of
the American public opposes child pornography. When asked in a

37. Heimbach Statement, supra note 29, at 33.
38. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 1142.
39. Enhancing Child Protection Laws after the April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision,
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing of the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 14 (2002) (statement of William C.
Walsh, lieutenant of police, Youth and Family Support Division, Dallas Police Dep’t (emphasis
added)).
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survey, “[s]ome 92% of Americans say they are concerned about
child pornography on the Internet,” and 50 percent of Americans
40
described child pornography as the most “heinous” online crime. In
the psychological literature, pedophilia is a recognized disorder, and
41
interest in child pornography is one manifestation of this disorder.
An American majority, recognizing the harms visited on children
through this form of pornography, expressed itself through its
legislators and enacted several rounds of legislation designed to
condemn child pornography and to combat the problem.42 The
43
government has a “compelling” interest in protecting children, and
this legislation effectuates this protection. Typically, rational actors
comport with this legislation because the costs of engaging in child
pornography (be they morally or punitively based) far outweigh the
benefits. The isolated nature of Internet communities, however,
permits the development of communities whose members believe that
the benefits of child pornography outweigh its costs.
The influence of a large, diverse community in establishing social
norms, and in determining sanctions for their transgression, is an
important one. Sanctions are pervasive enforcement mechanisms for
social norms, and the deterrent factor against breaking a norm is the
potential shame or embarrassment that a transgressor might feel
44
when exposed to society at large. Indeed, the law can act either to
encourage the development of new norms45 or, more powerfully, to
40. Press Release, Pew Internet & American Life Project, Fear of Online Crime (Apr. 2,
2001), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/press_release.asp?r=19.
41. Pedophilia, in AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR 571 (4th ed. 2000). Individuals with pedophilia often do not
feel negatively about their actions because it is an ego-indulging behavior. Id.
42. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 501(13), 117 Stat. 650, 678 (“In the
absence of Congressional action, the difficulties in enforcing the child pornography laws will
continue to grow increasingly worse.”); Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 121(1)(1), 110 Stat. 3009–26 (“[T]he use of children in the production of sexually
explicit material . . . is a form of sexual abuse which can result in physical or psychological harm,
or both, to the children involved”); Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99500, § 702(2), 100 Stat. 1783–74 (“Congress has recognized the physiological, psychological, and
emotional harm caused by the production, distribution, and display of child pornography by
strengthening laws prescribing [sic] such activity . . . .”).
43. See infra Part II.A.
44. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 915 (1996);
see also id. at 944 (“Feelings of moral culpability are tightly connected with prevailing social
norms.”).
45. See id. at 958 (“[R]egulation might even consist of direct coercion, designed to generate
good norms or to pick up the slack in their absence.”).
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shape preexisting norms in such a way that people will consistently
46
obey them because of the law’s powerful coercive effect. Yet some
members of society gain utility through deviating from the norm.47
More specifically, a law might express a general consensus
against treating people as objects—such as prohibiting the sale of
children—because society desires to deter, with official penalties for
violations, this type of thinking that violates deontological norms.48
Congress, recognizing the established norms of the American public,
enacted laws relating to child pornography to give meaningful
enforcement to morally and empirically based attitudes against the
viewing and dissemination of such material and in favor of protecting
the children involved in its production.
Child pornographers do not often participate in the larger norms
49
community that disapproves of their stock-in-trade. In fact, the
potential anonymity offered by the Internet provides child
pornographers with a means to opt out of established social norms;
instead, their interactions are limited to the comparatively smaller
realm of other child pornographers, who provide a supportive
environment that reinforces their actions.50 They are able to isolate
46. See id. at 958–59 (“[Laws] have an effect in shaping social norms and social meanings.
They do this in large part because there is a general norm in favor of obeying the law.”).
47. Id. at 918–19. The reasons behind this increased utility vary, but may include
disparagement of the norm’s worth based upon one’s own valuation of it, expression of
defiance, and/or communication of individual preferences. Id.
48. Id. at 964.
49. Presumably, if child pornographers regularly participated in extra-legislative
institutions of civil society (churches, town hall meetings, community recreational activities, and
the like), they would encounter numerous others who would express revulsion at the
pornographers’ activities. It would take an especially obstreperous objector to an established
norm to say, “99 out of 100 people, whom I respect well enough to spend a great deal of time
with, think that my activities cause unacceptable amounts of harm to children—yet I will not
allow this attitude to change my behavior in the slightest.” For commentary on an increasing
trend of isolation and detachment from civic commitments in American society, see generally
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000).
50. Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of Globalization,
91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 549 (2006) (“An Internet-based community, because it permits people to
isolate themselves into self-reinforcing groups defined by a single shared interest, can create an
atmosphere in which members perceive that there is greater lawlessness than actually exists.”).
Furthermore, not only can producers of child pornography themselves hide behind the
Internet’s anonymous façade, but the pandering of child pornography can also minimize the
transaction costs to criminals of gaining new information on the availability of their desired
materials: “The tools of globalization—mainly the Internet, which offers anonymous,
asynchronous communication—also offer offenders a way to obtain expertise at almost no
cost.” Id. at 542.
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themselves from other members of society whose opprobrium could
deter their conduct. Thus, they lose the benefit of other influences
which could shape their perceptions of the inappropriateness of their
behavior, and they also begin to believe that their narrow interest is
51
reflective of society as a whole. Their existence in small Internet
communities contributes to a renorming process whereby a behavior
traditionally condemned as unacceptable (viewing, producing, or
disseminating child pornography) becomes acceptable by virtue of the
limited community in which it is practiced.
One competing view of Internet communities regards them as
facilitative, creating opportunities for interaction with wide varieties
of people online without regard to race or gender, and dismisses as
“dystopian” those who lament the loss of face-to-face interaction with
human beings.52 But any such heightened online interaction, as well as
53
the development of “broadly supportive communities of intimacy,”
depends on an affirmative choice by the population subset at issue—
in this case, child pornographers—to engage with individuals holding
vastly different views than them. To the extent that child
pornographers choose to remain in meaningful contact only with
other child pornographers, they lack connections with other “social
milieus” and give in to the dominance of their particular online
realm.54 The mere fact of a community’s existence does not qualify the
community as good; one conception of a good community might
balance protection of individual autonomy with formation of bonds to
other people and view dimly the arbitrary exclusion of potential

51. As Keenan explains,
Largely because of the Internet, new communities abound. Traditional communities,
because they were defined mostly by geography, included people with a variety of
interests. On the Internet, new communities include people who may share only one
interest. . . . Such narrow communities are not necessarily bad—one can imagine
communities devoted to backgammon or quilting—but they can also be havens for
individuals whose preferences put them at odds with the geographic community in
which they live or the larger society.
Id. at 548.
52. Barry Wellman & Keith Hampton, Living Networked On and Offline, 28 CONTEMP.
SOCIOLOGY 648, 649 (1999). Notably, the authors also acknowledge that the lack of any direct
feedback in online communications condones the creation of messages that individuals would
not normally say to others in person. Id. at 650.
53. Id. at 651.
54. But cf. id. at 652 (“[Living in computer-supported social networks] enhances the ability
to connect with a large number of social milieus, while decreasing involvement in any one
milieu.”).

04__FAIRCHILD.DOC

174

11/1/2007 3:19:17 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:163

55
members from its ranks. Thus, as long as the insular community of
child pornographers disregards the disapprobation of a broader swath
of society, it functions only as a self-interested and isolated minority.
The establishment of law-backed norms against child
pornography in its various forms thus stems not from a “feel good”
impulse on society’s part, but from an empirically-based awareness
that child pornography actually harms children. Furthermore, it is
child pornographers who isolate themselves from the broad norms
community that condemns their work. Yet these individuals have
convinced themselves that their behavior is normal, in part by
participating solely in smaller, self-reinforcing norms communities.
Child pornography legislation, discussed in Part II, gives force to the
large-scale societal consensus against child pornography. Often,
however, child pornographers succeed in challenging these efforts on
First Amendment grounds.

II. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW
A. The Evolution of Child Pornography Law
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”56 This promise of protected
expression exists, among many other reasons, to protect the right to
speak one’s conscience freely and to encourage public dialogue
concerning a wide variety of views, even if those views are considered
vile and repugnant at the time of their airing.57 Although the First
Amendment operates by extending immunity from government
regulation to certain forms of speech, obscene speech is an area
unprotected by the First Amendment. In Miller v. California,58 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed an earlier case, Roth v. United States,59 in
60
determining that states could permissibly regulate obscene matter.
The Miller Court set forth a three-part test for determining whether
given matter was obscene: whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the whole work

55. Amitai Etzioni, Creating Good Communities and Good Societies, 29 CONTEMP.
SOCIOLOGY 188, 189–90 (2000).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
57. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
58. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
59. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
60. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
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appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work describes sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way; and whether the whole work
61
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Under this
definition, certain materials, even though they depicted sexual
conduct, could be protected speech as long as they had the types of
value that the Court mentioned; thus, a medical textbook focusing on
62
anatomy and depicting a sex act could be immune from regulation.
The Court left open the question of whether depictions of sexual acts
involving minors, even if they had artistic or literary merit, could
63
nonetheless be prohibited by the government.
Child pornography first gained widespread attention as a social
64
issue in the mid-1970s. Legislatures at the state and federal levels
began to enact laws designed to curb the emerging problem.65 In 1982,
the Supreme Court heard the first challenge to a child pornography
66
law in New York v. Ferber. A Manhattan bookseller, Paul Ferber,
was convicted under New York’s child pornography law67 for selling
to an undercover agent two films of young boys engaging in sexual
68
acts. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and
overturned Ferber’s conviction on two grounds.69 First, the court
found the New York statute underinclusive because it did not
prohibit the distribution of films of other dangerous activity not
involving minors.70 Additionally, because the statute’s language could
include materials produced outside New York State, as well as
materials containing adolescent sex in a non-obscene manner, the
court found the statute overbroad.71

61. Id. at 24.
62. Id. at 26.
63. Although the dissent considered the question of whether state regulation of the
distribution of sexually oriented material to minors would be permissible, id. at 47 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), it did not address the issue of whether the content of the material included sexually
explicit acts involving minors.
64. JENKINS, supra note 19, at 4.
65. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 5 (1977) (“[Child] pornography and child prostitution
have become highly organized, multimillion dollar industries that operate on a nationwide
scale.”).
66. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
67. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (Consol. 2006).
68. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751–52.
69. Id. at 752–53.
70. Id. at 752.
71. Id. at 752–53.
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Even though “[t]he Court of Appeals’ assumption was not
72
unreasonable in light of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions,” the U.S.
Supreme Court framed the issue differently from the court of appeals,
and treated child pornography as a category distinct from regular
obscenity, which was governed by the Miller test.73 Writing for the
majority, Justice White enumerated several reasons why “[s]tates are
entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic
depictions of children,” even at the risk of suppressing some
protected expression.74 First, the Court noted that states have a
compelling interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological
75
well-being of a minor.” That very compelling interest justified
protecting children, even to the detriment of other constitutionally
76
protected rights. The Court held that preventing children from being
sexually exploited and abused fell within the state’s compelling
interest.77 The Court deferred to the New York legislature’s findings
that involvement in child pornography was harmful to a child’s
78
health, and cited several studies documenting the harmful effects of
sexual exploitation on children later in life and linking children’s
sexual performances in pornographic materials to molestation by
adults.79
Second, the Court held that a state could regulate child
pornography’s dissemination in the interest of closing the distribution
80
network for material involving sexual exploitation of children. Given
that the state could identify children as compelling objects of the
law’s protection, the Court reasoned that the only way to effectively
enforce the protection of children would be to eliminate the market
81
for such material by heavily penalizing its distribution or promotion.
The Court’s third justification recognized that the advertising of
72. Id. at 753.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 756.
75. Id. at 756–57.
76. Id. at 757. The Court noted the prevalence of child-protecting legislation in other First
Amendment conflicts such as statutes prohibiting children’s distribution of literature on the
street, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and protecting children from being exposed
to non-obscene literature, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
77. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757 (“The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.”).
78. Id. at 757–58.
79. Id. at 758 n.9.
80. Id. at 759.
81. Id. at 760.
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materials containing child pornography was inherent in the
82
production of these already illegal materials. Thus, advertising child
pornography was a type of conduct inevitably incident to and
83
facilitative of its illegal production. Finally, irrespective of whether
the visual material in child pornography was legally obscene,84 the
Court held that its value was “exceedingly modest, if not de
85
minimis,” and that recognition of child pornography as a category of
speech outside the First Amendment’s protection was consistent with
stare decisis.86 The Court ultimately held that the New York statute
was not impermissibly overbroad, as only a “tiny fraction” of the
materials prohibited by the statute would actually be legitimate
depictions of child sexual performances (such as in medical
87
textbooks).
Though Ferber stood for a wide-ranging state ability to ban the
dissemination of child pornography, the New York statute at issue did
not deal with private possession of materials depicting sexual acts
involving minors. Possession of obscenity involving exclusively adult
88
actors was legal even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller.
The Court considered the possession of child pornography for the
first time in Osborne v. Ohio,89 and held that states could permissibly
90
ban possession of these materials. Drawing on many of the same
rationales the Court used in Ferber, Justice White wrote for the
majority that because there remained a compelling state interest in
protecting minors, the state could decrease demand for child
pornography by proscribing its possession.91 This compelling interest
could justify a state’s attempt to eliminate child pornography at all
92
levels of distribution, not just dissemination or sale. The Court

82. Id. at 761–62.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 762 n.15. In fact, the Court held that “[t]he test for child pornography is separate
from the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller.” Id. at 764.
85. Id. at 762.
86. Id. at 763 (noting that “[t]he question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the
First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech” and citing libel as an
unprotected category of speech).
87. Id. at 773–74.
88. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (“[T]he mere private possession of obscene
matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime.”).
89. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
90. Id. at 111.
91. Id. at 109–10.
92. Id. at 110.
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reiterated the justifications it had found persuasive in Ferber: because
child pornography leaves a permanent record of child abuse, and
because there is a link between these materials and sexual abuse,
banning possession of this pornography appropriately discouraged its
93
production.
B. Child Pornography Law in the Digital Age: The Child
Pornography Prevention Act and Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition
As a result of the Ferber and Osborne decisions, child
pornography remained a mostly limited, underground phenomenon
94
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Enhanced law enforcement
efforts increased the transaction costs to child pornography
consumers of dealing in these materials,95 while Congress, particularly
emboldened by Ferber, strengthened the prohibition against
disseminating child pornography by increasing its minimum
punishment from two to five years.96 For a while, it appeared that the
market for child pornography had shriveled nearly to the point of
97
extinction.
The Internet explosion of the mid-1990s caught legislators and
law enforcement by surprise. The number of host computers on the
98
Internet exploded from 300 in 1981 to 9,400,000 in 1996. In a tenyear period, the number of host computers increased by a factor of
99
150. Additionally, new technologies emerged that made it possible
for child pornographers to produce images that appeared to be

93. Id. at 111.
94. JENKINS, supra note 19, at 39–40.
95. FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 24, at 11.
96. Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 704(b), 100 Stat. 1783–
75. The minimum sentence for distribution, transportation, sale, intent to sell, or knowing
receipt, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)–(3) (2000), was increased to fifteen years for repeat offenders of
crimes against children by the PROTECT Act. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT), Pub. L. No. 108-21,
§ 103(b)(1)(C)(iii), 117 Stat. 650, 653.
97. JENKINS, supra note 19, at 40. In what was perhaps a harbinger of the technological
explosion to come, however, electronic bulletin boards (a precursor of sorts to the World Wide
Web) kept communications alive between those interested in swapping child pornography. The
limited technological capabilities of computing at that time, though, rendered the digital transfer
of pornographic images between users infeasible. Id. at 41–45.
98. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
99. See Krista Ostertag, The Net’s Come a Long Way, Baby, VARBUSINESS, Nov. 1, 1997,
at 115.
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children engaging in sexual acts, but were created entirely by
computer and did not involve any actual children—so-called “virtual”
100
child pornography. Child pornographers could mount an affirmative
101
defense to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(b) by proving
that the images of children used in pornographic material were not
real.102 This tactic presented an overwhelming challenge to law
enforcement, as even skilled online agents could not distinguish
between a virtual “child” and a real child victim of sexual
exploitation.103
Accordingly, Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996 (CPPA) to respond to these emerging technologies.104 It
amended the definitions of child pornography in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)
to include “any visual depiction, including any photography, film,
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture”
that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.”105 Congress intended the “appears to be” language to
include computer-generated images that were indistinguishable from
real children. Additionally, Congress added statutory language that
banned the pandering of such visual depictions by including within
the definition of child pornography any visual depictions that were
“advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a
manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”106

100. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 7 (1996).
101. This statute provides punishment for anyone who
knowingly possesses any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk,
or any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been
mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer, or that was produced using materials that have been mailed,
or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including
by computer . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2000).
102. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 72 (1996) (statement of Bruce A. Taylor, president and chief
counsel, National Law Center for Children and Families) (“Under present law, the Government
must prove that every piece of child pornography . . . is of a real minor being sexually
exploited.”).
103. See id. at 70 (“If a computer generated counterfeit picture of a child engaged in sex is
so good a fake that you cannot tell by looking at it, then police, courts, and indeed pedophiles
and seduced children would also be unable to know the difference.”).
104. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009–
26.
105. Id. § 121(2)(4), 110 Stat. at 3009–28 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000)).
106. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000)).
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The sweep of the CPPA’s language potentially included images
in which no child was harmed. Indeed, Congress identified a probable
First Amendment conflict in this area, as the statute could have
reached some images to which the Supreme Court had extended First
107
Amendment protection. In the case that would become Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition, a group of artists and film producers, fearing
108
the statute’s language would prohibit their legitimate work, filed
suit against the government shortly after the CPPA’s passage. They
alleged that the “appears to be” language of 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B),
as well as the “conveys the impression” pandering provision in
§ 2256(8)(D), were overbroad and chilled their valid expression of
works protected by the First Amendment.109 After the Ninth Circuit
reversed a lower court decision and found the CPPA facially
invalid,110 the government appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Free Speech Coalition holding that engendered the most
controversy was the Supreme Court’s affirmation that § 2256(8)(B)
111
was overbroad. The Court held, first, that the CPPA provided no
protection to images that were non-obscene under the Miller test; in
112
fact, the CPPA made no reference to the Miller test at all. As a
result, images containing teenagers engaged in sexual activity that had
artistic merit—for example, a rendition of Shakespeare’s Romeo and
Juliet—could fall under the CPPA’s prohibitions even though they
violated no contemporary community standards of decency.113 The
Court also rejected the rationale offered by the government for
prohibiting virtual child pornography: that such images “whet[] the

107. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 28–30 (1996). The Supreme Court held in Ferber that the
distribution of non-obscene depictions of sexual conduct not involving live performances was
still protected by the First Amendment. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764–65 (1982).
108. The group, Free Speech Coalition’s respondents, included a painter of nudes, an erotic
photographer, and the publisher of a naturist-oriented book. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535
U.S. 234, 243 (2002). The respondents made clear that their work did not include child
pornography, and that they opposed child pornography by offering a reward for information
leading to the arrest of persons involved in its production. Brief for Respondents at 9–10, Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (No. 00-795).
109. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 243.
110. Id. (citing Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999)). Yet four other
federal circuit courts sustained the CPPA in separate cases: United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394,
402–03 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 921 (4th Cir. 2000); United States
v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652 (11th Cir. 1999); and United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st
Cir. 1999).
111. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 256; see also sources cited supra note 8.
112. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 246.
113. Id. at 246–47.
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114
appetite” of child molesters and encourage them to commit illegal
sexual acts with children.115 The Court noted that “[t]he mere
tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient
116
reason for banning it” nor could speech be banned because it had
the potential to increase the chances of an unlawful act being
committed at an indeterminate point in the future.117 The majority
perceived no more than a tenuous connection between child
118
pornography and any actual molestation that might result from it.
Finally, the Court rejected the government’s “market deterrence”
rationale (that eliminating virtual child pornography would dry up the
market for actual child pornography) because there was no
underlying crime in virtual child pornography’s production; no actual
119
children were abused.
Significantly, however, the Supreme Court also struck down the
120
CPPA pandering provision in § 2256(8)(D). The majority held that
the “conveys the impression” language was overbroad because it
could reach material that actually contained no sexually explicit
content, but whose advertising merely gave the impression that such
content was present.121 The Court acknowledged Congress’s extensive
findings detailing the problems posed by materials looking like child
pornography, but made no findings addressing the dangers posed by
pandering materials.122 Section 2256(8)(D) also reached beyond the
rationale for regulating pandering set forth by Ginzburg v. United
123
States because there was no requirement that the material must

114. Id. at 253.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 253–54.
119. Id. at 254. The Court added that law enforcement difficulties in distinguishing between
real and virtual children also did not justify the CPPA, as it was impermissible to ban protected
speech to eradicate unprotected speech. Id. at 254–55.
120. Id. at 258.
121. Id. at 257. The Court gave the example of a movie containing no sexually explicit
scenes involving minors, but with previews conveying the impression that such scenes were in
the movie, being treated as child pornography. Id.
122. Id.
123. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). In Ginzburg, the defendant had been
convicted of sending an obscene publication through the mail; the prosecution relied on the
manner in which the defendant advertised the publications to prove their obscene content. Id. at
464, 467–70. The Court held that, in close cases, the manner in which a publication was
advertised could be probative of that publication’s obscenity. Id. at 470.
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124
have been pandered in a commercial context. Thus, the Supreme
Court held that Congress’s first attempt at regulating the pandering of
child pornography was overbroad and violated the First Amendment.

C. Pandering Provisions and the Law: The PROTECT Act and
United States v. Williams
Congress licked its wounds from the Supreme Court’s rebuke in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition and immediately set to work
drafting new legislation that would address the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment objections to the CPPA, yet at the same time provide
robust prosecution of those who sustained the market for child
pornography. The result was the PROTECT Act of 2003, signed into
law by President Bush on April 30, 2003.125 The law acknowledged the
Free Speech Coalition decision, but recognized that its impact had
made prosecutions of child pornography defendants extremely
difficult by forcing the government to overcome a “virtual porn
defense.”126 To comport with Free Speech Coalition, the PROTECT
Act changed the language in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) to prohibit visual
depictions “that [are] of, or [are] virtually indistinguishable from that
of, an actual minor.”127 The Act also attempted to respond to the
Supreme Court’s rejection of the CPPA’s pandering provision by
substituting what Congress thought was more narrowly tailored
language, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B). The new law
punished anyone who knowingly
advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the
mails, or in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including
by computer, any material or purported material in a manner that
reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that
the material or purported material is, or contains (i) an obscene
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit
128
conduct.

124. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258.
125. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 (PROTECT), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650.
126. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 45 (2003).
127. Id. at 6–7 (emphasis added). Congress intended an objective, reasonable person
standard—an ordinary observer—in determining whether a “virtually indistinguishable”
depiction looked like an actual child. Id. at 7.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2004) (emphasis added).
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In drafting this provision to comply with the Supreme Court’s
decision, Congress (perhaps unwittingly) resurrected the market
deterrence rationale rejected in Free Speech Coalition, justifying the
new pandering provision on the ground that “even fraudulent offers
to buy or sell unprotected child pornography help to sustain the
illegal market for this material.”129 Congress also believed the
pandering provision was crucial to help prosecutors to pursue
possessors of actual child pornography whom they could not reach by
other statutes.130 Yet the new language still did not escape First
Amendment concerns. A group of senators noted the objection of a
leading First Amendment scholar that the “purported material”
language tipped the whole Act “over the constitutional edge,”131 and
observed themselves that the lack of a nexus between the pandering
of obscenity and any actual obscene material endangered the validity
of the entire provision.132 A letter written by the American Civil
Liberties Union pointed out that the distribution of protected speech
could be punished merely because of its marketing, and criminal
liability did not require underlying obscene material.133 Despite these
objections, however, the final version of the PROTECT Act included
134
the pandering provision.
These lurking First Amendment infirmities came back to haunt
Congress and the PROTECT Act in a 2006 case, United States v.
135
Williams. The defendant, Michael Williams, had posted a message
in an Internet chat room giving the impression that he possessed child
136
pornography. An undercover agent engaged the defendant in an
Internet chat, culminating in the defendant posting a hyperlink which
137
led to images of actual minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
Williams was charged with possessing child pornography and with
129. S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 12 (2003).
130. Id. at 23–24.
131. Id. at 24 (quoting Professor Frederick Schauer).
132. Id.
133. Id. app. at 32.
134. The inclusion of these problematic provisions, despite arguments in the record against
them, probably resulted from a combination of legislative compromise and a rush to get the
statute codified. See id. at 24 (“We do not want to put child porn convictions on hold while we
wait another six years to see if the law will survive constitutional scrutiny.”).
135. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 1874
(Mar. 26, 2007) (No. 06-694).
136. The message read: “Dad of toddler has ‘good’ pics of her an [sic] me for swap of your
toddler pics, or live cam.” Id. at 1288.
137. Id. at 1289.
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138
pandering it under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B). He entered a
conditional guilty plea and subsequently challenged the pandering
provision’s constitutionality in the Eleventh Circuit on grounds of
139
overbreadth and vagueness.
The Eleventh Circuit started with Williams’s overbreadth
challenge. Though the court recognized that the government may
prohibit commercial speech that is false or proposes an illegal
140
transaction, The court held that Williams’s pander was noncommercial and could not be regulated under the “fighting words”
141
incitement doctrine. The absence of a statutory link to content was
also problematic, as speech promoting alleged material could be
criminalized even if the material was non-pornographic or
nonexistent.142 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit held that courts could
not criminalize subjective beliefs that materials contained child
143
pornography based on the way in which they were communicated.
The court rejected the notion that pandering could be a stand-alone
offense under Ginzburg v. United States, and reemphasized the Free
Speech Coalition holding that Ginzburg only applied in a commercial
context.144
The court also found unconvincing the market deterrence
rationale advanced by the government in this case and discussed
during Congress’s deliberations over the PROTECT Act. The
Eleventh Circuit determined that Congress’s link between pandering
and stamping out the market for child pornography was empirically
145
inadequate. Although Congress cited a compelling interest in

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1297. The court pointed out that, even in a commercial pandering situation, the
only person able to complain about false advertising of a desired product would be the intended
purchaser of child pornography—hardly the basis for a legitimate claim. Id.
141. Id. at 1298. This doctrine prohibits government limitations on speech unless the speech
can be shown to incite imminent unlawful conduct. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969); see also supra text accompanying note 34. The fact that the Court found Williams’s
pander did not imminently incite illegal activity does not preclude the probability that some
child pornography pandering, and perhaps a substantial amount, may still in fact be inciteful and
therefore subject to restriction under Brandenburg. See Williams, 444 F.3d at 1298 (“The First
Amendment plainly protects speech advocating, encouraging or approving of otherwise illegal
activity, so long as it does not rise to ‘fighting words status.’” (emphasis added)).
142. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1298.
143. See id. at 1299 (“In this case . . . the law does not seek to attach liability to the materials,
but to the ideas and images communicated to the viewer by those materials.”).
144. Id. at 1301.
145. Id. at 1303.
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protecting children from sexual predators, the court failed to find a
close nexus between this interest and preventing the pandering of
child pornography, even given Ferber’s allowance of market
deterrence as a justification for eliminating the profit motive for
146
Any aid to prosecutors in virtual
exploiting real children.
pornography cases also did not justify the establishment of pandering
provisions; such aid revived the rejected market proliferation
rationale and targeted lawful speech (the communication of one’s
thoughts about material) to prohibit unlawful speech.147 According to
the Eleventh Circuit, the government could not use the pandering
provision as a crutch to prove the existence of real children in
pornographic materials.148
Williams also prevailed on his vagueness challenge. The court
focused on the lack of an underlying material requirement in the
pandering statute. The “reflects the belief”149 language could establish
criminal liability based on the communication of perverse thought
alone, regardless of whether that thought related to child
pornography.150 Furthermore, the obscurity of the statute’s intent
requirement allowed the provision to potentially criminalize a
possessor of cute children’s photographs who, by his promotion of the
materials, merely intended to convey a naughty double-entendre.151
Because the provision provided no affirmative defense that there
were no underlying pornographic materials, people who (for
admittedly base reasons) intended to give the impression that they
possessed child pornography, even when they possessed nothing at
all, could also have been exposed to criminal liability.152
Thus, each legislative attempt to combat child pornography has
met with First Amendment-based setbacks in the courts. This has
been consistently true of pandering provisions. Though such
provisions have attempted to serve the congressional goal (and public
objective)153 of eliminating the market for child pornography, their
reach has strayed into areas of speech protected by the First

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id. at 1303–04.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1306 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 2004)).
Id.
Id. at 1306–07.
Id. at 1307.
See supra Part I.B.
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Amendment. Part III focuses on pandering provisions specifically,
highlighting some elements of Free Speech Coalition and Williams in
which the courts’ reasoning was unconvincing.
III. EVALUATING THE FREE SPEECH COALITION
AND WILLIAMS DECISIONS
Nine Supreme Court justices in Free Speech Coalition, and a
three-judge appellate panel in Williams, faced the delicate task of
balancing the cherished freedoms of the First Amendment against the
real harms to children caused by child pornography. Both cases came
down on the side of the First Amendment, and as a result, lessened
the protection of children against forces that enhanced the market for
child pornography—particularly pandering. Although these jurists
most likely had benign motives and reached their decisions after
careful deliberation and weighing of the competing interests of both
cases, elements of both opinions disregard salient equities that favor
the government’s defense of anti-child pornography laws.
In Free Speech Coalition, the government presented all the
evidence it could possibly muster before the Supreme Court, offering
congressional records,154 legislative findings,155 amicus briefs,156 and
quantitative evidence157 to defend the CPPA’s constitutionality—and
still lost. According to the Court, “[t]he Government has shown no
more than a remote connection between speech that might encourage
thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse.”158 The majority
demanded a “significantly stronger, more direct connection” to
accept a market deterrence rationale of prohibiting virtual child

154. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 270 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the legislative history makes clear that Congress did not intend the CPPA to
apply to works of art, as the majority feared).
155. See id. at 244–45 (majority opinion) (“In its legislative findings, Congress recognized
that there are subcultures of persons who harbor illicit desires for children and commit criminal
acts to gratify the impulses.”).
156. See, e.g., Brief of the States of New Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (No. 00-795) (advocating deference to the “extensive
testimony and written materials” that Congress used in considering the CPPA). The amicus
brief further recognized that children “are the ‘most vulnerable and defenseless’ members of
our society.” Id. (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 376 (N.J. 1995)).
157. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 245 (citing WALTER R. MCDONALD & ASSOCS.,
INC. & AM. HUMANE SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. OF
CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORT 1999 (documenting that
93,000 children were victims of sexual abuse in one year alone)).
158. Id. at 253.
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pornography on the ground that it encourages pedophiles to commit
159
abuse.
This rhetoric begs the question of exactly how much convincing
evidence it will take for the government to mount a successful
defense of any legislation targeted at the child pornography market.
In congressional hearings leading up to the CPPA, one national
expert on child abuse testified to a faux-pander that attracted one
160
man who made clear his imminent intent to have sex with children.
Data closely linked the possession and purchase of child
pornography—that is, the creation of a market for it—with abuse of
children.161 The Supreme Court refused to defer to Congress’s
extensive findings in this case despite sufficient evidence for the
Court to find in favor of the government. This pattern has repeated in
other significant cases.162 Is the Court looking for a specific form of
test that shows—through, say, multivariable regressions and standard
deviations—an unassailable link between pandering and increased
demand for child pornography? If it is impossible to even glean such
evidence, it is disingenuous for the Court to keep insisting that the
government cannot prove that link.163 And because of the clandestine
nature of the child pornography market, it may indeed be nearly
164
impossible to gather such evidence to the Court’s satisfaction.
If the Supreme Court in Free Speech Coalition was ignorant,
willfully or not, of Congress’s findings, the Eleventh Circuit in
Williams ignored a crucial fact of the case that should have made its

159. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying note 39.
161. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628–36 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for ignoring Congress’s “mountain of data” demonstrating the national
extent of rape and domestic violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 616–17 (1995)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he determination [of an activity’s effect on interstate commerce]
requires an empirical judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make
with accuracy.”). Justice Breyer noted in Lopez that “reports, hearings and other readily
available literature make clear that the problem of guns in and around schools is widespread
and extremely serious,” id. at 619, and provided a lengthy appendix, containing over one
hundred of these sources, of which the majority could have availed itself, id. at 631–44.
163. Admittedly, the rationale of Morrison indicates that increasing an already sizeable
legislative record may accomplish precisely nothing. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (majority
opinion) (“In contrast with the lack of congressional findings that we faced in Lopez, § 13981 is
supported by numerous findings . . . . But the existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.”).
164. Lydia W. Lee, Note, Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996: Confronting the
Challenges of Virtual Reality, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 639, 661 (1999).
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disposition facile. Williams was not just making an empty pander; he
165
actually possessed real child pornography. The Eleventh Circuit
made much of its objection that the paucity of a statutory link to
166
actual content rendered the PROTECT Act invalid for vagueness.
But with Williams, actual content was present, rendering irrelevant
one of the court’s overbreadth concerns.167 If the Eleventh Circuit
wanted to attack the PROTECT Act for First Amendment
unconstitutionality ab initio, it could have at least chosen a more
sympathetic defendant—one not in possession of actual child
168
pornography. That the court found compelling Williams’s argument
that he was “victimized” by an overbroad pandering statute, even
when he was pandering material that he possessed, smacks of a
certain cynicism about Congress’s motives in passing the PROTECT
Act to curtail the market for child pornography.
IV. A NEW VISION FOR CHILDREN,
PANDERING, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Reconceptualizing the Doctrine
The Williams decision is not authoritative in all jurisdictions; the
Supreme Court could either accept or reject its reasoning. Yet even if
the Supreme Court overturns Williams and upholds the PROTECT
Act’s pandering provision as constitutional, a new approach to
evaluating pandering-versus-free speech conflicts, based upon a childcentered approach to this area of First Amendment law, would
obviate the need for the back-and-forth between legislatures and
courts in trying to decide the constitutionality of future pandering
provisions.
165. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
1874 (Mar. 26, 2007) (No. 06-694) (“[Williams’s] computer hyperlink contained, among other
things, seven images of actual minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”).
166. Id. at 1306 (“[T]he law does not require the pandered material to contain any particular
content nor, in fact, that any ‘purported’ material need actually exist.”).
167. Id. at 1298–99 (“Because no regard is given to the actual nature or even the existence of
the underlying material, liability can be established based purely on promotional speech
reflecting the deluded belief that real children are depicted in legal child erotica . . . .”). Williams
had more than a belief—he knew that his material was illegal child pornography. See id. at 1288–
89 (describing Williams’s online comments and actions).
168. Even though Williams challenged the statute facially, rather than as applied, id. at 1296,
a more compelling case would have been made by a defendant who possessed no child
pornography whatsoever but gave the impression that he had such materials merely to create a
titillating impression in the reader’s mind, id. at 1307.
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The prevailing approach to pandering is panderer-oriented,
based on the rights that the panderer draws from the First
Amendment.
Thus,
panderers—including
actual
child
pornographers—can mount a successful claim that anti-pandering
statutes violate their inherent rights to self-expression, even if the
manner of that expression happens to offend a majority of people.169
The right to express one’s thoughts, regardless of the merit of their
contents, is not trivial; self-expression is at the heart of freedom of
conscience and democratic participation.170 Indeed, a democratic
society demands a dialectic between prevailing attitudes and
unpopular views, encouraging frank discussion toward the aim of
synthesizing consensus on a norm.171 The First Amendment is a
powerful and necessary guarantor of this potential for self-expression.
Yet it is precisely the First Amendment’s power that makes it
dangerous in the hands of those who wield it to do harm, and for
exactly that reason, the First Amendment has not proved an absolute
172
bulwark against every form of expression in every circumstance.
National security has trumped individual First Amendment rights
173
when a clear and present danger threatened the nation. The right to
engage freely in commercial speech does not extend to false
174
advertising or proposed illegal transactions, and as demonstrated in

169. See id. at 1298 (“The First Amendment plainly protects speech advocating or
encouraging or approving of otherwise illegal activity . . . . Thus, the non-commercial, noninciteful promotion of illegal child pornography, even if repugnant, is protected speech under
the First Amendment.”).
170. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those
who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile . . . .”), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969).
171. See id. (“[D]iscussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination
of noxious doctrine . . . .”).
172. See id. at 373 (noting that fundamental rights such as free speech are not necessarily
absolute rights).
173. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(noting that the government may restrict free speech in cases of clear and imminent danger to
the country); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 997 (W.D. Wis. 1979)
(threatening to issue a preliminary injunction to prevent the publication of an article containing
secrets of hydrogen bomb production if the parties did not settle by a certain date). But see N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (establishing an extremely
high, though not undefeatable, presumption against prior restraints on expression).
174. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980).
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Part II, the Supreme Court does not extend protection to speech that
175
is either obscene or contains child pornography.
Permitting pandering in the name of First Amendment rights
unleashes a very powerful force onto a very vulnerable population.
Even though no objectionable material may be at the root of a
pander, the pandering itself constitutes the tools for a crime, as it
heightens interest in child pornography and makes it more likely that
176
actual child molestation will take place. Pandering gives child
pornographers unfettered freedom to hawk their wares, secure in the
knowledge that as long as they possess only the type of material from
which they could mount a successful affirmative defense (for
example, virtual child pornography), their pandering will go
unpunished.
A child-centered approach to pandering, on the other hand,
would more effectively shield a vulnerable population from the
tremendous power of the First Amendment. It would recognize that
not only the First Amendment, but other essential constitutional
177
178
rights such as justice and liberty, are implicit in the protection of
179
all American constituencies —perhaps even more poignantly in the
case of children. The Constitution’s claims to liberty and justice ring
hollow if they do not extend to protect vulnerable minority
populations. Indeed, this very concern was on the mind of the
Constitution’s Framers in crafting the federal government structure to
prevent against the tyranny of majorities in state legislatures.180 The

175. See supra Part II.A.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 27–32.
177. U.S. CONST. pmbl. A suggestive argument maintains that the words in the Preamble
are not just empty rhetoric, but ought instead to play a normative role in constitutional
dialogue, presumably including constitutional adjudication. See Sanford Levinson, Why It’s
Smart to Think About Constitutional Stupidities, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 376 (2000) (“If the
Constitution proclaims to speak in the name of the collective People, then . . . the People should
engage in a national conversation about whether the Constitution really is a fit instrument for
achieving the truly inspiring goals set out in the magisterial Preamble. How, indeed, do we
‘establish Justice’ or ‘assure Domestic tranquility’ or ‘secure the Blessings of Liberty’?”).
178. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
179. See Mark S. Kende, Filtering Out Children: The First Amendment and Internet Porn in
the U.S. Supreme Court, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 843, 856 (advocating a First Amendment
approach that weighs the interests of groups like parents and children, rather than purporting to
use strict scrutiny analysis).
180. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 43–44 (2005)
(recounting James Madison’s ultimately successful efforts in The Federalist Papers to persuade a
skeptical public that a strong national legislature was necessary to protect the liberties of
citizens, especially minorities).
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First Amendment’s guarantee of free expression, powerful as it may
be, cannot be allowed to override the protection of the laws granted
to vulnerable groups like children: “Free speech is not so absolute or
irrational a conception as to imply paralysis of the means for effective
181
protection of all the freedoms secured by the Bill of Rights.”
Shifting paradigms toward evaluating pandering based on its
harm to children will necessarily require reconsideration of a
particular area of the law—yet such a shift is not without precedent.
The treatment of rape in the criminal law, for example, has enhanced
182
protections for victims by focusing less on their alleged promiscuity.
The enactment of “rape shield” laws, prohibiting introduction of a
victim’s past sexual history to show that it was more likely that the
victim invited intercourse with the defendant because of a
promiscuous reputation, is emblematic of a change in attitudes
regarding the law’s treatment of another vulnerable population
segment.183 In other words, rape trials have progressed from being
about the victim to increasingly concerning themselves with the
184
defendant’s conduct. Although the required paradigm shift in child
pornography pandering jurisprudence operates in somewhat the
opposite manner—focusing on the child victims of that pandering,
instead of shifting away from them—the desired result is the same:
increasing protection for the more vulnerable of two groups by
reconsidering the object of that protection.
Framing the pandering issue as one fundamentally concerning
children requires, at a basic level, treating children differently than
panderers—and more worthy of protection—for purposes of
weighing rights. Yet this attitudinal shift is not unprecedented; the

181. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
182. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1094 (1986) (“[C]ourts, in defining the
crime [of rape], have focused almost incidentally on the defendant—and almost entirely on the
victim.”).
183. See FED. R. EVID. 412 (“The following evidence is not admissible in [almost] any civil
or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct . . . (1) Evidence offered to prove
that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior. (2) Evidence offered to prove any
alleged victim’s sexual predisposition.”).
184. See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement,
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 945, 949–50 (2004) (observing that only three states still retained a prompt complaint
requirement, and then only in spousal sexual offense cases, whereas only three other states
retained corroboration requirements); see also FED. R. EVID. 413(a) (permitting, in a rule
enacted in 1995, introduction of evidence that a sexual assault defendant committed past sexual
assault offenses).
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law treats children as essentially different in several other ways.
Minors, for example, lack the capacity to assent to binding
185
contracts. The law assesses different punishments for juvenile
186
offenders than for adults who commit the same crime. This area of
the law, in particular, has also experienced a shift as American society
has deemed it inappropriate to subject juveniles to the death
187
penalty. Some states have even authorized capital punishment for
convicted child molesters.188 At a more quotidian level, minors are not
allowed to smoke, vote, or drink alcohol before they reach certain
ages.
If the law treats children differently in areas that at least
tangentially concern their safety, then children should also receive the
benefit of preferential treatment in a small area of First Amendment
law that directly protects their well-being. Ultimately, this requires
society to countenance the loss of a small amount of First
Amendment freedoms—the pandering of purported matter ruled
illegal and directly linked with harm to children—when drawing the
line at how far those freedoms may extend. Given the many citizens
189
who strongly disapprove of child pornography, it is likely that
overwhelming numbers of people would be comfortable placing
190
children far behind that line. The Supreme Court has already

185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981). Those who enter into contracts
with children may have an expectation interest that the latter will honor their contractual
obligations—and still be disappointed when the law holds the contract void for lack of capacity.
The law regards these upset expectations as acceptable in the name of protecting children.
186. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 958.04 (LexisNexis 2006) (authorizing alternate sentences
and prohibiting incarceration in traditional adult facilities for “youthful offenders”).
187. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–68 (2005) (holding that a “national
consensus” of thirty states prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles had emerged, thus
requiring the total abolition of the juvenile death penalty under the Eighth Amendment).
188. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7115(I) (2006) (authorizing the death penalty for rape of
a child under fourteen years old); State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (La. 1996) (upholding
Louisiana’s death penalty law for rape of a victim under twelve years old). Admittedly,
however, these state laws encounter considerable constitutional difficulties in light of Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (prohibiting imposition of the death penalty for rape), though
it is debatable whether Coker was limited to the rape of an adult woman, Wilson, 685 So. 2d at
1066.
189. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
190. In State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007), the chief justice of the Utah Supreme
Court struggled to define exactly where that line could be drawn in protecting a child from
polygamous marriage. Maintaining that the state had no business regulating the private conduct
of a religious practice, Chief Justice Durham “could not uphold Holm’s bigamy conviction on
the basis that the religiously motivated conduct at issue is inherently harmful to children who
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indicated its willingness to draw such a protective line; New York v.
Ferber held that the government has a compelling interest in
“safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
191
minor.” Children are vitally important in the Court’s eyes: “A
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, wellrounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens . . . .”192
B. Counterarguments and Responses
A child-based treatment of pandering provisions is not without
its potential dangers. For one, it is possible to overplay the extent of
the problem, and in doing so, inadvertently exacerbate the interest in
the child pornography market that pandering fuels. The “moral
panic” phenomenon experienced over sensational, heinous crimes
such as child kidnappings, brutal murders, or online predation193 may
lead to positive results (such as enhanced penalties for sex offenders),
but could also serve to obscure the actual level of threat posed by
child pornography.194 If a child-centered approach is susceptible to a

grow up in polygamous homes.” Id. at 775–76. That is, consenting adults possessed a freedom,
based on Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), to “choose the nature of their relationships ‘in
the confines of their homes and their own private lives.’” Holm, 137 P.3d at 776 (quoting
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567). But because the defendant had committed unlawful sexual conduct
with the minor whom he married in a non-state-sanctioned ceremony, id. at 730–31, the chief
justice would have held that Holm’s bigamy conviction did not violate his Fourteenth
Amendment claim of individual liberty, id. at 776 n.34.
For support of the larger point, that a broad swath of society favors the protection of
children, see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
191. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
192. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
193. In the fall 2006 television lineup, an average of 9.1 million viewers weekly enjoyed
Dateline NBC’s “To Catch a Predator” series featuring online stalkers of children invited to a
house where, rather than a submissive child, a television crew and law enforcement officials
awaited them. Allen Salkin, Web Site Hunts Pedophiles, and TV Goes Along, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 2006, at A1. The proliferation of “To Catch a Predator,” and shows like it, has made
realizable the peculiarly American dream of “settl[ing] down on your couch for an evening of
scaring the hell out of yourself over your kids.” James Poniewozik, Breaking America’s Favorite
Taboo, TIME, Oct. 8, 2006, at 39.
The intent here is certainly not to trivialize the magnitude of the problem. There is a real
issue that children do fall victim to child pornography, and are subjected to sexual abuse
because of it. See supra Part I.A. Nevertheless, responsible treatment of the subject will caution
against the hyperbolic, emotionally-charged panic that undermines otherwise persuasive
arguments in favor of curtailing the market for child pornography.
194. See Suzanne Ost, Children at Risk: Legal and Societal Perceptions of the Potential
Threat that the Possession of Child Pornography Poses to Society, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 436, 443–47
(2002) (documenting British society’s outrage resulting from media coverage of Internet child
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societal construction of children as innocent, it may actually promote
more child sex abuse, precisely because abusers are attracted to the
195
(pandered) image of the innocent child. First Amendment scholar
Amy Adler posits that merely passing more laws about child
pornography, or revising existing ones, will not solve the problem if
the laws force society to regard children as sexual objects in
evaluating whether certain cases meet the definitions of child
pornography.196 The treatment of children in child pornography cases
is paradoxical, Professor Adler argues, because in perceiving a need
to increase discussion about the prohibited conduct—child sexual
abuse—society enters a Foucauldian cycle of increased desire to
engage in that conduct, with some members of society perversely
choosing to participate in such behavior precisely because it violates a
norm widely accepted as taboo.197
Furthermore, carving out a narrow exception for pandering child
pornography—taking a child-based approach that is not found in
other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence—could add confusion
198
to an already fragmented body of law. For a while, courts will

pornography—when the media, in one case, demonstrated a link between child pornography
and a child’s death—and arguing that such a moral panic could distort the magnitude of the
actual threat from child pornography).
195. See id. at 457–58 (“Our objectification of children as innocent may cause us to reduce
them simply to objects of innocence, the one aspect of childhood that may be of the greatest
attraction to the child sexual abuser.”).
196. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 264–65
(2001).
197. Id. at 249–51; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text. Indeed, Professor Adler
explicitly references Foucault in countering the commonly-held assumption that talking about a
problem is the most effective means for its resolution; instead, according to Foucault, the
communal logorrhea inherent in constantly discussing the problem merely advances a preexisting cycle of repression. Adler, supra note 196, at 270–71. For the development of this aspect
of Foucault’s phenomenology, see generally 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., 1990) (1978).
198. See Adler, supra note 6, at 1000–01 (2001) (arguing that a significant shift in child
pornography law—regarding child pornography not just as speech, but as action harmful by
itself—has contributed to making this body of First Amendment law even more incoherent, and
despairing of finding a coherent theory to First Amendment law). Professor Adler maintains
that anti-child pornography advocates have conflated the clear semiotic distinction between the
thing represented (child abuse) and the object that represents it (a pornographic image
depicting such abuse). Id. at 985–86. But it is not immediately apparent that the distinction is so
clear: images of child pornography have a pronounced link to abusive sexual conduct with a
child, see supra text accompanying notes 27–32, a point which even Adler acknowledges. Id. at
987 (“Child pornography is not just the product of a crime of child abuse. It may sometimes
serve as an inducement to commit it.”). And although Adler focuses mainly on First
Amendment overbreadth challenges in defining the content of child pornography, Adler, supra
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struggle to reassure themselves that they are not merely punishing
thoughts or fantasies expressing themselves as speech, but are instead
targeting assertive conduct in the form of words—conduct which
199
Courts and
directly furthers a market that harms children.
legislatures should adopt limiting provisions to prevent this narrow
approach from spilling over into other realms of protected speech.
For instance, adult pornography, and the advertising of it, should not
be subject to First Amendment restraints merely because children
could stumble upon it or purposely choose to view it.200 Additionally,
an adequate test exists for evaluating adult pornography—the
obscenity test from Miller—that overcomes the hurdles of the First
Amendment.
The ambit of the child-centered approach is best cabined from
the danger of overbroad prohibition of speech (and extension into

note 6, at 961–69, she says nothing about whether statutes prohibiting the pandering of child
pornography would be susceptible to her criticisms.
199. See Adler, supra note 6. at 999–1001 (criticizing the complete elimination of the
speech/action distinction in child pornography law); see also Robert Post, Recuperating First
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (1995) (postulating that First Amendment
doctrine is incoherent because it focuses only on words, rather than on action taken in the
context of the social norms the words embody).
Axiomatic to American criminal law is the refusal to punish people for their thoughts
alone. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Lafayette, 334 F.3d 606, 613 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
convicted sex offender who wandered into a park and admitted to having sexual thoughts about
the children therein could not constitutionally be punished merely for holding repugnant
thoughts). Criminal statutes encompass an actus reus requirement because people must
voluntarily make an affirmative decision to manifest their thoughts through actions. After all,
the First Amendment provides not only freedom of speech, but also the freedom either to
express or not express one’s thoughts. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). Doe was
reversed, however, by an en banc Seventh Circuit, which ruled that, in going to the park and
searching for children to satisfy his sexual cravings, the defendant conducted himself in a
manner not worthy of protected expression, but rather as a predator. Doe v. City of Lafayette,
377 F.3d 757, 763–65 (7th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Therefore, the defendant was not being punished
for thought alone but for action resulting from those thoughts which nearly came to child
molestation. Id. at 766–67.
200. There are arguments both for and against this proposition, which are beyond the scope
of this Note. Compare Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 28–29 (1971) (arguing that a majoritarian view of pornography as
morally polluting should be given wide judicial latitude in evaluating statutes banning
pornography), and Steven E. Merlis, Note, Preserving Internet Expression While Protecting our
Children: Solutions After Ashcroft v. ACLU, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 117, 126–31
(2005) (proposing increased use of filtering software and “cyber zoning” to restrict pornography
to certain Internet domains), with Svetlana Mintcheva, Protection or Politics? The Use and
Abuse of Children, in CENSORING CULTURE: CONTEMPORARY THREATS TO FREE
EXPRESSION, supra note 6, at 167 (submitting that a perceived “need” to protect children from
viewing pornographic material merely amounts to further censorship).
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other arenas of constitutional interpretation that do not beg for such
an approach) by explicit statutory requirements that panderers
possess actual pornographic content. Such a linguistic link already
exists in state statutes; Ohio does not permit anyone to “[k]nowingly
solicit, receive, purchase, exchange, possess, or control any material
that shows a minor participating or engaging in sexual activity,
201
masturbation, or bestiality . . . .” whereas Kentucky requires actual
knowledge that the material in question is child pornography:
A person is guilty of advertising material portraying a sexual
performance by a minor when, having knowledge of its content and
character thereof, he or she writes or creates advertising or solicits
anyone to publish such advertising or otherwise promotes the sale or
202
distribution of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor.

This type of textual requirement of a panderer’s possession or
knowledge of actual child pornographic material has withstood
203
constitutional challenges in the state courts. Although a statute
prohibiting even non-content-based panders would go the furthest in
quelling the market for child pornography, such textual content
requirements in the federal statutes would accomplish much of that
goal without running afoul of overbreadth doctrine.
In operation, the philosophical change engendered by a childcentered pandering provision would address these potential
objections. It would recognize that the protection of children from a
means of solicitation that furthers the potential for their harm is even
more compelling than the First Amendment right of self-expression.
A child-centered pandering provision would provide an explicit
statutory link to actual content and express recognition of the
204
legislative purpose to protect children. Such a provision would

201. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.322(A)(5) (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added).
202. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.360(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added).
203. See State v. Meadows, 503 N.E.2d 697, 704–05 (Ohio 1986) (holding that, given the
state’s compelling interest in protecting children, § 2907.322(A)(5) does not violate the First
Amendment); State v. Eichorn, No. 02 CA 953, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 3101, at *14 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 27, 2003) (declining to find § 2907.322(A)(5) overbroad). But see State v. Tooley, No.
2004-P-0064, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 6032, *21 & n.37 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2005)
(disagreeing with at least three other state appellate districts in holding § 2907.322(A)(5)
unconstitutional), rev’d, State v. Tooley, Nos. 2006-0105 & 2006-0216, 2007 Ohio LEXIS 1655
(Ohio July 25, 2007).
204. For a promising model statute, see Brian G. Glass, Note, Protecting Children and
Expression: Towards Better Tailored Child Pornography Laws, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 471,
495 (2001) (“No person shall produce, promote, distribute, view or possess sexual material that
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eschew the punishment of mere thoughts or fantasies that is
205
anathema to the freedom to think as one chooses. It would treat
pandering as a tool, and as conduct inextricably incident to crime,
rather than the mere expression of thoughts. And it would reduce the
available means by which those who possess illegal child
pornography, or those who encourage them, perpetuate the harm
done to children.
CONCLUSION
Congress recognized a problem when it saw it. Consequently,
Congress made good-faith efforts to establish that the pandering of
child pornography furthered the market for illegal pornographic
material. In so doing, it substantiated the nexus between those who
consume child pornography and those who abuse children. Congress
drafted its legislation based on extensive testimony and data from
numerous experts, and on the justification that a broad social norm
had coalesced against the market for exploitative child pornography.
Yet each proposed solution contained the potential to hamper rights
of self-expression, and given the First Amendment’s powerful
purchase on the ability to express oneself in the manner most
reflective of one’s conscience, expression won out in the balancing of
rights performed by American courts.
The appropriate frame of reference in evaluating this category of
competing rights claims must center on the object of the most
significant harm—the child. Yet the institutions responsible for
shaping the law that protects this vulnerable group have not
embraced this orientation. If courts and legislatures focus on children
as the beneficiaries of the law’s protection, they will find that
pandering of child pornography is not just speech; it is a tool used by
molesters, pedophiles, and others who possess base motives vis-à-vis
children to facilitate their crimes. This recognition, coupled with the
corollary emphasis on protecting children, is the constitutional

a reasonable person . . . would believe has caused and continues to cause direct harm to an
individual child or to an identifiable class of children.”).
205. See Clay Calvert, Freedom of Thought, Offensive Fantasies, and the Fundamental
Human Right to Hold Deviant Ideas: Why the Seventh Circuit Got it Wrong in Doe v. City of
Lafayette, Indiana, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 125, 135 (2005) (arguing that the First Amendment ought
to protect all manner of thoughts, as long as they do not end up in criminal conduct or in
absolutely unprotected expression like violence or obscenity). This Note has attempted to show
that the pandering of child pornography can end up in both.
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imperative of society’s commitment, at its most ideal, to use the law
to seek true justice.

